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Analysis of Senaite Joint Resolution 1 (SJRl); Proposed Amendments
to the Iowa Constitution for Limiting State General Fund Expenditures and Tax Revenues.
Analysis Summary:
1. Potential shift in the executive/legislative balance of power and potential conflict
with other provisions of the Iowa Constitution.
2. Process to access "rainy day" funds under SJR 1 appears to be substantively
different from current Iowa Code.
3. Iowa's current financial position is more attributable to state sales and use tax
increase than 99 percent expenditure rule.
4. The proposed Amendment and existing statutory 99 percent expenditure rule
remain untested by circumstances other than robust economic conditions.
5. Allocation of any surplus revenues to the GAAP Reduction Account is dropped.
6. A minority of 21 votes in the Senate may defeat a question involving a tax increase.
Reduced flexibility for state government response during cycle of political economy.
7. Probable consequences of the 60 percent voting rule include reductions in spending
growth for functions of state government, state aid to local government and
increases in property taxes and other local taxes.
8. Among the surrounding states, only South Dakota imposes a supermajority
requirement for increasing taxes. No supermajority requirements are imposed in
36 states; only, II states apply a supermajority requirement to all state taxes.
9. Incentive for developing special purpose funds and for earmarking state revenues.
10. Iowa's tax burden relatively flat over four decades. Dramatic increases not likely.
Appears to be lack of compelling arguments for proposed amendment over status
quo statutory policies already in effect.
Analysis of Senate Joint Resolution 1 (SJRl): Proposed Amendments
to the Iowa Constitution for Limiting State General Fund Expenditures and Tax Revenues.
Senate Joint Resolution 1 (SJRl) would place two proposed Constitutional Amendments before
the voters of Iowa. The first amendment proposal would add a General Fund Expenditure Limit
(GFEL) to the Constitution. The second proposed amendmentwould require a 60 percent
majority ofmembers from each house in the General Assembly to increase state income, sales or
new state taxes. Therefore, a key purpose of the proposed amendments is to impose a
constitutional limit on state general fund spending and state taxes.
A "yes" vote for each proposal implies that the voter favors adding the proposed amendments to
the Iowa Constitution.
A "no' vote for each proposal implies that the voter favors continuation of the current statutory
spending limits and voting rules.
Part A. An Analysis of SJR 1, Section 1: "The 99 Percent Expenditure Rule." Senate Joint
Resolution #1, Section 1 proposes to estabUsh a Constitutional General Fund Expenditure Limit
(GFEL) equal to 99 percent of the adjusted revenue estimate presented by the state government
revenue estimating conference established by the General Assembly. Detailed comparisons of
the proposed amendments with existing statutes enacted since 1992 are presented in Table 1.
Analysis of ten key findings along with supportive information are presented below.
1. If passed, SJR1 represents a potential shift in the executive/legislative balance of
power and may conflict wkh other existing provisions of the Iowa Constitution. Existing
Iowa Code 8.56 states that "an appropriation shall not be made from the cash reserve fund which
would cause the fund's balance to be less than three percent of the adjusted revenue estimate for
the year for which the appropriation is made unless the bill or joint resolution is approved by
vote of at least three-fifths of the members of both chambers of the general assembly and is
signed by the governor."
In contrast, SJRl Section 1.5. indicates that any surplus equal to ten percent or less of the
adjusted revenue estimate of the fiscal year may be included in the adjusted revenue estimate for
the following fiscal year if approved in a bill receiving the affirmative votes of at least three-
fifths of the members of each house of the General Assembly. The phrase "and is signed by the
governor" is dropped from the SJRl language. Section 1.7 further indicates the Governor shall
submit and the General Assembly shall pass a budget which does not exceed the state general
fund expenditure limitation. Section 1.8 indicates the Governor shall not submit and the General
Assembly shall not pass a budget which in order to balance assumes reversion of any part of the
total of the appropriations included in the budget.
Article 3, Section 15 of the existing Iowa Constitution specifically states that-"every bill" which
shall have passed the general assembly shall be presented to the governor and that his veto may
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onlybe overridden by a 2/3smajority of themembers of both houses. In addition, the
Constitution specifically states that the governor mayapprove appropriations bills in whole or in
part. Finally, the Constitution specifically implies thatappropriation bills are to be enacted into
law in the same manner as provided for other bills. SJRl, Section 1.5 requires a 60 percent
majority vote of both houses to expend surplus funds when the end-of-year surplus is lessthan
10percentof adjusted revenue estimate anddrops theGovernor's signature requirement
compared to current statutes.
Article 3, SEC. 15. "....Executive approval-veto-item veto by governor. SEC. 16. Every
bill which shall have passed the general assembly, shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the governor. If he approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it with
his objections, to the house in which it originated, which shall enter the sameupontheir
journal, and proceed to reconsider it; if, after such reconsideration, it againpass both
houses, by yeas and nays, by a 2/3s majority (67 percent) of the members of each house,
it shall become a law, notwithstanding the governor's objections. If any bill shall not be
returned within three days after it shall have been presented to him, Sunday excepted, the
same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the general assembly, by
adjournment, prevent such return. Any bill submitted to the governor for his approval
during the last three days of a sessionof the general assembly, shall be deposited by him
in the office of the secretary of state, within thirty days after the adjournment, with his
approval, if approved by him, and with his objections, if he disapproves thereof.
The governor may approve appropriation bills in whole or in part, and may disapprove
any item of an appropriation bill; and the part approved shall become a law. Any item of
an appropriation bill disapproved by the governor shall be returned, with his objections,
to the house in which it originated, or shall be deposited by him in the office of the
secretary of state in the case of an appropriation bill submitted to the governor for his
approval during the last three days of a session of the general assembly, and the
procedure in each case shall be the same as provided for other bills. Any such item ofan
appropriation bill may be enacted into law notwithstanding the governor's objections, in
the same marmer as provided for other bills."
Some Constitutional scholars may argue that use of reserve funds constitutes a legislative action
subject to the checks and balances of the Constitution as provided for "all appropriations and
other bills" and would still require the governor's signature.
Other Constitutional scholars may argue that if passed SJRl will allow the General Assembly to
access emergency reserve funds without the governor's request or approval. If so, the General
Assembly would be using the Constitutional Amendment process which requires no
Gubernatorial signature to create a legislative process that requires no gubernatorial signature.
The potentially conflicting provisions raise important constitutional issues regarding the balance
of power and checks and balances between legislative and executive branches of state
government. Should theGeneral Assembly beallowed to expend emergency reserve funds
without the Governor's approval? The issuemayormaynot be settled without a court
challenge and final interpretations by the Iowa Supreme Court.
2. The process to access "rainy day" funds under SJR 1 appears to be substantively
different from accessing "rainy day" funds under the current Iowa Code. SJR 1 increases
the size of surplus subject to a 3/5s vote of both Houses of the GeneralAssembly from a 3
percent surplus (contained in existing statutes) to a 10 percent surplus (as proposed in SJR 1 for
the IowaConstitution). Surplus is defined in SJRl as the cumulative excess of revenues and
other financing sources over expenditures andotheruses for the general fund at the endof the
fiscal year. According to one interpretation, the surplus includes the CashReserve and Iowa
Ecoriomic Emergency Funds outlined in existing statutes.
Second, SJRl requires that an identified surplus canonlybe transferred to the adjusted revenue
estimate for the following fiscal year. This potentially raises a timing issue related to accessing
Iowa's rainy day fiinds in case of an emergency during the current fiscal year.
Third, SJRl drops the statutory restriction currently in the Iowa Code that appropriations from
the rainyday funds may onlybe used for emergency purposes. Thus,SJR 1Constitutionally
imposes a substantive processchange forwhich there is no trackrecord of experience.
SJR 1 requires a 3/5 majority vote of the Houseand Senate to include surplus funds in the
adjusted revenue estimate for the followingyear if the surplus is 10 percent or less of the
adjusted revenue estimate.
Iowa Code 8.55; 8.56; 8:57 requires a 3/5s vote of both houses, plus the Governor's
signature to use Cash Reserve Funds if the Cash Reserve Fund is below a minimum of 3
percent of the adjusted revenue estimate. The Iowa Economic Emergency Fund (lEEF)
may contain up to a maximum of 5 percent of the adjusted revenue estimate. The lEEF
may only be used for emergencies and is subject only to a majority vote ofboth houses
and Governor's signature.
3. State government's strong financial position is more attributable to the 1992 sales
and use tax increase than the 99 percent expenditure rule. To suggest Iowa's fiscal position
is a primary result of the 99 percent expenditure rule is largely false and misleading. After
two Special Legislative Sessions in 1992, a package ofmeasures were passed to eliminate the
state's $409 million dollar GAAP deficit. A 99 percent appropriation rule and a set of "rainy
day" funds were enacted along with a 1 percent statewide sales and use tax increase that
generated an estimated $270 million of additional annual state revenues. If the 1992 sales and
use tax increase had not been implemented as part of the deficit reduction package, Iowa would
have collected about $1.7 billion less in state tax revenues during the past six years.
Had the99percent appropriation rule been enacted without the1percent statewide sale and use
tax increase, the state revenue basewould have beenabout 8 percent smallerduring each of the
past six years. Larger spending cuts would have been required to balance the state budget. If
one assumes that the required onepercent budgeted surplus would haye represented the total
appropriation allocation to the "rainy day" funds and GAAP deficit reduction fund as outlined in
the Iowa Code 8.55;8.56;8.57, Iowa state government would have fully funded the Cash Reserve
Fund during the past six years, but it would still be payingoff the GAAPdeficit andwouldnot
yet have accumulated any funds in the Iowa Economic Emergency Fund. Under this scenario,
the state tax reductions experienced in recent years wouldnot likely have occurred.
4. The proposed Constitutional Amendment and existing statutory 99 percent
expenditure rule remain untested by circumstances other than robust economic conditions.
Since 1992, Iowa's financial positionhas benefited from the second longest national economic
expansion of the 20th Century. For example, if a recession were to haveoccurred, state
government revenues could havebeenreduced by $500 million during the last sixyearperiod.
If the Constitution is amended and the new budgetary process does not work well, the formal
amendment process must be repeated to make any readjustments in the Constitution. The
amendment process requires two votes by successive General Assemblies on an identical bill
with passage by voters in a statewide electionbefore the Constitution can be re-adjusted. The
processwould minimally require 18months but more typicallywould take longer. Some
amendments have taken longer than a decade for approval. Alternatively, existing statutes can be
revisedduring any GeneralAssemblyor special sessionby passageofboth Houses by majority
vote and signature by the Governor.
5. SJR1. Section 5 drops the allocation of any surplus revenues to the GAAP
Reduction Account as required in the existing Iowa Code. The 1992 GAAP budget deficit
has been eliminated and the presumption in SJR 1 is that GAAP deficits and accrued revenues
will never reappear. Technically, a GAAP deficit may still occur if reserve funds are depleted in
a ye^ before revenues fail to meet 99 percent of the revenue conference estimate. However, the
Governor is required by Iowa Code 8.31 to reduce all appropriation allotments so that there is no
overdraft of deficit in any state fund at the end of a fiscal year.
Part B. Analysis of SJR 1, Section 2: "The 60 Percent Voting Rule." SJRl, Section 2
proposes to establish a new Article VIII requiring a 3/5s majority for tax law changes. A bill
containing provisions for enacting, amending or repealing the state income tax or enacting,
amending, or repealing the state sales and use taxes, in which the aggregate fiscal impact of these
provisions relating to those taxes results in a net increase in state tax revenues, as determined by
the General Assembly, shall require the affirmative votes of at least 3/5s of the whole
membership of each house of the General Assembly for passaged. A bill that establishes a new
state tax to be imposed by the state shall require the affirmative votes of at least 3/5s of the whole
membership of each house of the general assembly for passage. This section does not apply to
income tax or sales and use taxes imposed at the option of local government.
6. The 60 percent voting rule allows a minority of 21 votes in the Senate to defeat a
question involving a tax increase. A probable consequence is reduced flexibility for a state
government response during cycles in Iowa's political economy. SJR 1would increase the
ability of a well financed, well organized vocal minority to potentially determine the outcome of
tax questions. Political scientists have long identified the notion that it is easier for a minority in
the political process to kill a bill in comparison to developing a majority support for gaining
passage. The minority control ratio represents the minimum number of votes required to defeat a
proposal in relation to the minimum number of votes for passage.
Under current rules, a majority vote is defined as 50 percent plus one in both houses of the
General Assembly. Therefore a minimum of77 votes is required for bill passage in both houses.
However, a bill can be defeated by either house. The minimum for bill defeat is 25 votes in the
Senate. Therefore the minority control ratio is 32.5 percent, indicating a vote for passage is
worth about 1/3 of the relative worth of a vote for bill defeat under majority voting rules.
Under the SJRl, a minimum of 90 votes would be required for passage in both houses of the
General Assembly to pass bills involving a tax increase. However, only 21 votes in the Senate
would be required to defeat such a bill. The minority control ratio declines to 23.3 percent,
indicating a vote for passage is worth less than 1/4 of the relative worth of a vote for bill defeat.
The minority control ratio analysis shows that even under majority voting principles, a minority
can effective limit the outcomes of the political process. Furthermore if the voting requirements
increase from a simple majority to a 60 percent supermajority, the minority control ratio declines
from nearly 1/3 to less than 1/4. Thus, a smaller minority is required to effectively limit the
outcomes of the political process.
In relation to the total votes available in the General Assembly, 21 Senatorial votes represents 14
percent of the full General Assembly membership and 41 House votes represent 27.3 percent of
the full General Assembly membership. Thus, substantially less than 40 percent of the full
General Assembly membership is needed to defeat bills that would impose a net tax increase.
The ability of a small minority to influence the political process may be of particular concem
under the following special circumstances in which the proposed amendments would allow the
decisions of one General Assembly to arbitrarily constrain decisions of a future General
Assembly and reduce the flexibility of state government responses during cycles in Iowa's
political economy.
Example 1. Tax reductions may be implemented during a pre-election campaign only to be
followed by state revenue shortfalls in the post election period. Under SJR 1, a minority of 40
percent of the members in one house in the General Assembly could prevent access to cash
reserves as well as prevent an increase in state sales, income or other state taxes. If this process
is repeated over time, political election cycles effectively ratchet down state spending.
Example 2.Taxreductions may be implemented during a strong economy only tobe followed by
state revenue shortfalls in an economic downturn. Under SJR 1, a 40 % minority ofone house in
the GeneralAssembly could prevent access to cashreservesas well as prevent an increase in
state sales, income or other state taxes. If this process is repeatedover time, economic cycles
effectively ratchet down state spending.
The scenarios above stand in contrast to actual set of Iowa budget policies used in 1992 to reduce
Iowa's $409million GAAPbudget deficit. As previously examined, if spending controls had
been enacted without a 1 cent state sales tax increase in 1992, ceteris.paribus, Iowa would still be
paying off the GAAP deficit and lowans likelywould not have enjoyed recent tax cuts.
7. Over time, the probable consequences of the 60 percent voting rule include
reductions in spending growth for functions of state government, state aid to local
government as well as increases in property taxes and other local taxes. Approximately half
of the state general fund is currently allocated for local government assistanceand property tax
relief Property taxes represent the largestsingle sourceof local tax revenues and the largest
single source of state and local revenuescombined. If a significant downturn in the state
economywere to occur, the odds increase for reductions in local governmentaid for schools,
cities and counties and for increases in property taxes and other local taxes—to the degree that a
60 percent voting rule effectivelyratchets down state government revenues and expenditures
compared to the existing policy.
If a significantdownturn in the state economy were to occur, the odds also increase for direct
spending reductions in state government functions such as higher education, community college
and K-12 education support programs, human services, corrections, judicial systems, veterans
affairs, natural resources, agriculture and economic development compared to the existing policy.
Devolution ofmany federal public assistance programs to the state and local level has created
new roles for state and local govemments in serving as automatic economic stabilizers during
economic downturns. During economic downtums, tax revenues tend to decline while public
assistance expenditures increase. If SJR 1, Section 2 is added to the Constitution, state flexibility
to perform an economic stabilization role is reduced. In turn, the reduction in state flexibility
may potentially shif^more of the economic stabilization burden onto local government. While
SJRl would not prevent a state tax increase, it would tend to insulate taxpayers from the impacts
of an economic downturn.
8. Of states contiguous to Iowa, only South Dakota imposes a supermajority
requirement for increasing taxes. No supermajority requirements are imposed in 36
states; 14 states have imposed a supermajority requirement on some tax increases; Only,
11 states apply the requirement to all state taxes. Michigan applies the supermajority
requirement only to state imposed property tax increases. Florida applies the requirement only to
increases in corporate income taxes. Arkansas was the first state to apply a supermajority
restriction in 1934 and applies the limitation to all state taxes except sales and alcohol taxes. The
states imposing supermajority requirements on all taxes include Arizona, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and
Washington (See Table 2).
State rankings of state and local government fiscal performance indicatorsprovide a mixed
picture.Michigan and Florida are excludedfor the reasons indicatedabove.
State and Local Taxes per capita: Six of the 12 supermajority states ranked in the
upperhalf of all states in terms of 1998 stateand local taxes per capita. Six ranked in the
lower half (Governing Magazine Supplement, 1999).However, eight of the supermajority
states ranked in the bottom half of states in terms of state and local taxes as a percent of
personal income, while four states ranked in the upperhalf (Tax Foundation).
State share of state and local spending: In eight supermajority states, the state share of
combined state and local general spending was above the national average of43 percent,
while the state share was below the national average in four states. Delaware was the state
with the highest state share at 63 percent. Iowa is near the national average at 44.6
percent. (Governing Magazine Supplement, 1999)
Education Spending per capita: Eight of 12 states ranked in the lower half of all states
for education spending per capita. Only four states ranked in the upper half. Iowa
currently ranks 16th in total education spending per capita but ranks 30th in K-12
spending per capita (Governing Magazine Supplement, 1999).
Personal income growth 1997/1994: Seven of the 12 supermajority states ranked in the
top half of states forpersonal income growth. However five ranked in the lower Half of
the states for personal income growth (Governing Magazine Supplement, 1999).
State and Local Debt per Capita: Seven of the 12 supermajority states ranked in the top
half of states in terms of state and local public debt per capita. Five states ranked in the
lower half of states. (Governing Magazine Supplement, 1999).
Property Taxes Per Capita: Eight of the 12 supermajority states ranked in the bottom
half of the states in terms of property taxes per capita. Four states ranked in the top half.
(Governing Magazine Supplement, 1999). Half of the 12 states have implemented the
supermajority voting requirement only recently, therefore any effects in regards to
increasing public debt and/or property taxes are likely to be limited (Table 2).
Simple comparative analyses of state rankings are hazardous due to variability in a number of
factors. A review ofmore extensive research nationally has failed to establish any strong link
between state tax and expenditure limitations or states with lower tax levels and higher economic
performance or growth patterns over time (Federal Bank of Chicago, 1996; Isserman, 1994;
Howard, 1990). Minnesota for example, hashigher taxes, higher public service levels and higher
growth.
Iowa's experience with a 60 percent voting rulehas beenlimited to publicbond elections for
local units of government (IowaCode 75.1; 296.6). Whilepublic bond elections represent a
political processthat is different from theGeneral Assembly, the bond election process suggests
two probable consequences from a 60 percent majority voting rule. First, the time andcosts for
approval are increased when local units of government repeatedly resubmit bondissues to gain
the necessary 60 percent majority. Second, facilities andpublic infrastructure such as schools
andjails potentially become more obsolete and substandard over time due in part to the 60
percent majority requirement. Recent assessments of school andjail facilities in Iowa suggest
that health and safety violations may remain unaddressed in part because of the inability to pass
localpublic bonds under the 60 percent voting rule as required in Iowa Code 75.1; 296.6. (Note
that some bond votes involving jails arid other public facilities are not subject to a 60 percent
voting rule).
Data on School bond votes for the period of 1981 to 1998 indicates that roughly half of the bonds
(257 out of 522) passed by more than 60 percent approval, one fourth (130) were defeated even
though they received more than a simple 50 percent majority, and one fourth (135) were defeated
by receiving less than 50 percent approval (Rebuild Iowa Coalition and supplemental data).
Therefore, the outcome ofnearly a fourth of the school bond votes were affected by the
difference between a 50 and 60 percent voting requirement.
9. Passage of SJR1 may create an incentive for developing special purpose funds and
for earmarking state revenues. The passage of 60 percent voting rule potentially creates an
incentive for the General Assembly to earmark revenue sources and to create more special
purpose funds that would have balances not considered part of the general fund cash position
subject to the GFEL limits. (Note: any special purpose funds which may be created in the future
would have to meet the requirements of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
10. Iowa's tax burden has remained relatively flat over four decades. Dramatic
increases are not likely. Thus, the evidence appears to lack compelling arguments
for the proposed amendment over status quo statutory policies already in effect.
In general, Iowa state and local taxes as a percent of personal income has remained relatively flat
during the past four decades. Over this period, Iowa's state and local taxes have varied between
10.5 and 12.5 percent of personal income due primarily in year to year fluctuations in personal
income growth. In 1998, Iowa's state and local taxes represented 11.31 percent of personal
income, based on information from the Tax Foundation, a national nonpartisan education
organization.
Iowa state and local taxes were $2,924 per capita in 1998 and ranked 27th among 50 states.
Iowa's 1998 state and local taxes were 11.31 percent ofpersonal income and ranked 25 among
the 50 states. In addition, the Tax Foundation ranked Iowa 39th from the top among the 50 states
in terms of total combined federal, state and local taxes as a percent of income. Iowa's total
combined tax burdenrepresented 33.65 percent of income compared to the 35.30percent average
for the nation.
These comparisons donot take into account the state tax reductions enacted in 1998 including
thedoubling of thepersonal exemption and across theboard cut in personal income tax rates of
10 percent. Therefore, the 1999 state tax collection indicators for Iowa are likely to show
declines in state taxes per capita and in relation to personal income.
Table 1. Comparison of SJR 1 and Iowa Code 1997 Supplement.
Bold Underlined text refers to a substantive difference between SJR 1 and the Iowa Code)
Senate Joint Resolution 1
(Constitutional Amendment Proposal)
SJR 1 Section 1. New: ARTICLE XIII.
General Fund Expenditure Limitation
1. Deflnitions
a. "Adjusted Revenue Estimate" means most recent
revenue estimate determined before January 1 or a
lesser later revenue estimate before adjournment,
adjusted by subtracting estimated refunds payable and
adding anv surplus defined in subsection 5.
Establishes a Constitutional Requiremeiit for the
General Assembly to establish a revenue estimating
conference by law which determines the revenue
estimates.
b. "General Fund" means principal operating fund of
the state which shall be established by the General
Assembly by law.
c. "New Revenues" means moneys received by the
state due to increased tax rates or fees or newly created
taxes or fees over an above those in effect on January
1 following the revenue estimating conference.
New revenues also include revenues received by the
general fund due to transfers which are in effect as of
January 1.
The revenue estimating conference shall determine
the eligibility of transfers to the general fund to be
considered as new revenue in determining the state
General Fund Expenditure Limitation.
2. State General Fund Expenditure Limitation (GFEL)
is created and calculated for each fiscal year begirming
on or after July 1 following effective date.
3. The General Fund Expenditure Limit (GFEL) shall
be 99 % of the "adjusted revenue estimate."
Existing Statutes
Iowa Code 8.54
1. Definitions
a. "Adjusted Revenue Estimate" means most recent
revenue estimate determined before January 1 or a
lesser later revenue estimate before adjournment,
adjustedby subtracting estimated refunds payable and
adding anv new revenues which mav be considered
to be eligible for deposit in the general fund.
Not in Iowa Code
Not in Iowa Code, but refers to Section 8.22A.
b."New Revenues" means moneys received by the
state due to increased tax rates or fees or newly created
taxes or fees over an above those in effect on January
1 following the December revenue estimating
conference.
New revenues also include revenues received by the
general fund due to transfers which are in effect as of
January 1 following the December revenue
estimating conference.
The department of management shall obtain
concurrence from the revenue estimating
conference on the eligibility of transfers to the
general fund of the state which are to be considered
as new revenue in determining the state GFEL.
8.54.2. State General Fund Expenditure Limitation
(GFEL) is created and calculated for each fiscal year
beginning on or after July 1.1993.
3. SAME as Iowa Code.
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4. The General Fund Expenditure Limit (GFEL) shall
be used by Governor in preparation of budget and by
General Assembly in budget process.
If a new revenue source is proposed, the budget
revenue projection included in the adjusted revenue
estimate shall be 95 percent of the amount remaining
after subtracting estimated refunds payable from the
projected revenue source.
If a new revenue source is established and
implemented, the originalGFELamountprovided in
subsection 3 shall be readjusted to include 95 % of the
estimated revenue from the new source.
4. SAME as Iowa Code
SAME as Iowa Code
SAME as Iowa Code
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5. Anv ^iirnliis existing at the end of the fiscal vear 5. For fiscal vears when Iowa Code 8.55.2 results in
which exceeds ten nercent of the adjusted revenue monevs beiup transferred to the peneral fund, the
a'stimate of that fiscal vear shall be included in the oripinal state shall he readiusted to include
adjusted revenue estimate for the following vear. the monevs which are transferred.
Anv surnlus existinp eaual to ten nercent or less of 8.SS.2. If the Iowa Economic Emergency Fund
the adjusted revenue estimate of the fiscal vear mav exceeds 5% of the adiusted revenue estimate for the
he included in the adiusted revenue estimate for the fiscal vear. the monevs in excess of this amount
following fiscal vear if aooroved bv a bill receiving
3/5s vote of the whole membership of each
shall be transferred to the peneral fund.
R.55.3 The monevs in the Iowa Economichouse of the peneral assemblv.
Surplus means cumulative excess of revenues and
Emerpencv Fund shall only be aoDrooriated bv the
General Assemblv for emereencv exoenditures.
other financing sources over exoenditures and
other uses for the perieral fund at the end of the 8.55.4: 8.56.1. Interest and earnings on the
fiscal vear. balances of the Iowa Economic Emergency Fund
and Cash Reserve Fund po into the Rebuild Iowa
Infrastructure Fund.
8.56. The maximum Cash Reserve Fund balance is
5% and the minimum is 3%. To go below the
minimum renuires a 3/5s vote of the members of
both houses and the povernor's sipnature. Use of
the funds are suhiect to a snecific criteria outlined.
8.57.1: 8.57.3: 8.57.4. Surnlus revenues po first to
the cash reserves fund, second to a GAAP deficit
reduction account, includinp elimination of the
making of anv aonronriation in an incorrect fiscal
year, and then to the Iowa Economic Emereencv
Fund. "GAAP" means penerallv accented
accountinp nrincinles as established bv the
povernmental accountinp standards board.
857.5. The Rebuild Iowa Infrastructure Fund shall
consist of annronriations made to the fund and
transfers of interest, earninps and monevs from
other funds as nrovided hv law. The fund shall not
be considered nart of the balance of the general
fund of the state.
6. The scope of the expenditure limitation under
subsection 3 shall not include federal funds, donations,
constitutionally dedicated moneys and moneys in
expenditures from a state retirement system.
8.54.6. SAME as Iowa Code
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Section 7. The governor shall submit and the general
assembly shall pass a budget which does not exceed
the state general fund expenditure limitation.
None
7. SAME as Iowa Code
The povernor in siihmittinp the budget and (he
peneral assemblv in nassinp the budpet. shall not
have recurrinp exnenditures in excess of recurring
revenues.
Section 8. The governor shall not submit and the
General Assembly shall not pass a budget which in or
der to balance assumes reversion of any part of the
total of the appropriations included int he budget.
8. SAME as Iowa Code
Section 9. The state shall use consistent standards, in
accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles, for all state budgeting and accounting
purposes.
Iowa Code 8.53. Different language but SAME
REQUIREMENT
Section 10. The General Assembly shall enact laws to
implement this section.
Not In Existinp Iowa Code
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SJR 1 Section 2. New: ARTICLE XIII. 3/5s
Majority for tax Law Changes.
Not in Existing Iowa Code
3/f5s Maioritv to Increase Taxes. Not in Existinp Iowa Code
Section 1. A bill containing nrovisions enactins.
nmendinp or renealinp the state income tax or
enacting, amenriinp. or reoealinc the state sales and
use taxes, in which the apprepate fiscal impact of
these orovisions relatinp to those taxes results in a
net increase in state tax revenues, as determined bv
the General Assemhiv. shall reauire the affirmative
votes of flf least 3/5s of the whole membershio of
each house of the General Assemblv for passaged.
This section does not aoolv to income tax or sales
and use taxes imnosed at the ootion of local
povernment
3/5s Maioritv to Knact New State Tax. Section 2. A
hill that establishes a new state tax to he imnosed bv
the state shall reauire the affirmative votes of at
least 3/5s of the whole membershio of each house of
the peneral assemhiv for nassape.
Not in Existinp Iowa Code
Enforcement of .3/5s Maioritv Reouirement Section
3. A lawsuit challenpinp the nroner enactment of a
bill Dursuant to Section 1 or 2 shall be filed no later
than one vear followinp enactment.
Failure to file such lawsuit within the one-vear time
limit shall nepate 3/Ss maioritv reouirement as it
annlies to the bill.
Each bill to which section 1 or 2 anolies shall
include a senarate orovision describing the
reouirements for enactment orescribed bv section 1
or 2.
Not in Existinp Iowa Code
Not in Existing Iowa Code
Not in Existinp Iowa Code
Implementation. Section 4. The peneral assemblv Not in Existinp Iowa Code
shall enact laws to implement sections 1 through 3.
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Secrion 3 The forepoine t)r0t30sed Amendments to the
Consfinition of the State of Iowa, having been adooted
and agreed to hv the Seventv-seventh General
Af?fiemblv. 1998 Session, thereafter dulv oublished and
now adonted arid apreed to bv the Seventv-eiehth
General Assembly in this ioint resolution, shall be
snbmitteH to the peonle of the State of Iowa at a
snecial elention called for that oumoses to be held on
Tuesday the 29th of June of the year 1999. in the
manner renuired bv the Constimtion of the State of
Iowa and the Laws of the State of Iowa.
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Table2. Supermajority Requirements andOther Constitutional Restrictions on Legislative Tax
Powers
State Adopted Referendum
or Voter
Initiative
Legislative
Majority
Required
Applies To
Arizona 1992 I 2/3 All taxes
Arkansas 1934 R 3/4 All taxes except sales and
alcohol
California 1979 I 2/3 All taxes
Colorado 1992 I 2/3 All taxes *
Delaware 1980 R 3/5 All taxes
Florida 1971 R 3/5 Corporate income tax **
Louisiana 1966 R 2/3 All taxes
Michigan 1994 R 3/4 State property tax
Mississippi 1970 , R 3/5 All taxes
Nevada 1996 I 2/3 All taxes
Oklahoma 1992 I 3/4 All taxes
Oregon 1996 R 3/5 All taxes
South Dakota 1978 I 2/3 Sales and income tax
1996 R 2/3 All taxes
Washington 1993 I 2/3 All taxes ***
* Tax increases automatically sunset unless approved by the voters at the next election.
** The constitution limits the corporate income tax rate to 5 percent 3/5 vote needed to
increase beyond 5 percent.
Tax increases producing revenue that do not exceed the spending limit must be approved
by 2/3 legislative vote; tax increases that produce revenue over the limit, must be
approved by 2/3 legislative majority and by the voters.
***
Source: NCSL survey of state fiscal officers, 1996
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